1. Overview
UserSec Collective is a pro-Russian hacktivist entity active since mid-2022. The group promotes itself as a decentralised digital army operating in support of Russian national interests and frequently targets government, financial, and public sector websites across NATO-aligned nations. Like other politically aligned hacktivist groups, UserSec primarily uses denial-of-service attacks and defacement tactics, alongside an active propaganda presence on Telegram and fringe social media platforms.
Although lacking the technical sophistication of state-sponsored advanced persistent threats (APTs), UserSec is disruptive in nature and part of a broader ecosystem of Russian-aligned hacktivism. It often collaborates with other collectives such as NoName057(16), XakNet Team, and Anonymous Russia.
2. Origin and Evolution
UserSec emerged during the height of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Initially operating as a fringe online group sharing memes and nationalist content, it quickly evolved into a loosely coordinated collective conducting cyber attacks under the guise of patriotic defence.
The group organises campaigns through Telegram channels, where it publishes target lists, attack instructions, and ideological statements. UserSec has since declared opposition to NATO, the European Union, Western media, and companies perceived as hostile to Russian interests. While the group’s visibility and output vary, it resurfaces during periods of political tension, elections, and symbolic dates.
3. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)
UserSec’s primary mode of attack is disruptive rather than covert. It relies on publicly available or self-developed tools to launch denial-of-service attacks and post defacements. TTPs include:
- Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS)
High-volume HTTP, TCP, and UDP flood attacks using custom scripts and tools such as LOIC variants or user-submitted payloads (T1499). - Web defacement
Exploitation of misconfigured or outdated web servers to post political statements, images, and propaganda content (T1491.001). - Telegram coordination
Daily lists of targets, live updates on service disruption, and encouragement of follower participation in attacks using DDOS tools or botnets. - Psychological operations
Propagation of fear and misinformation, often exaggerating the effectiveness or scale of their campaigns (T1585). - Shared infrastructure
May reuse or share C2 infrastructure with other hacktivist collectives, and occasionally amplifies claims by groups like KillNet or NoName057(16).
4. Targeting Profile
UserSec targets institutions and services that symbolise opposition to Russian geopolitical interests. These typically include:
- Government websites and ministries in NATO-aligned countries
- Municipal and regional public services
- Military and defence-adjacent platforms
- Media organisations critical of Russian policy
- Financial institutions and election infrastructure
- Logistics, transport, and airport services
In the UK, targets have included government information portals, regional transport websites, and educational platforms. These attacks typically result in temporary disruptions rather than data breaches or long-term compromise.
5. Notable Campaigns and Victims
UserSec does not always operate independently, but it has claimed or contributed to several regional attacks, including:
- Disruption of municipal websites in Poland and the Czech Republic
- Participation in a multi-group DDoS campaign targeting UK Parliament and Scottish Government sites in 2023
- Defacement of a German university site with anti-NATO propaganda
- Amplification of fabricated leaks involving Baltic government documents
- Support for KillNet-led attacks against healthcare and logistics systems in Eastern Europe
Its activity peaks during symbolic events, such as Victory Day (9 May), NATO summits, and elections in Eastern Europe.
6. Technical Indicators
Due to the group’s reliance on basic tools and publicly coordinated attacks, technical indicators vary, but commonly include:
- DDoS traffic from residential proxies and VPN services
- Payloads executed via browser-based flood tools
- IP ranges associated with botnet-for-hire services
- CMS exploit attempts against outdated WordPress and Joomla installations
- Download links to denial-of-service tools shared via Telegram
Because most attacks are volumetric, defence depends on infrastructure resilience and proactive monitoring.
7. Defensive Measures and Recommendations
To mitigate threats from UserSec Collective and similar groups:
- Deploy cloud-based DDoS mitigation solutions such as Cloudflare, Akamai, or Fastly
- Monitor public channels for attack announcements that include your brand or infrastructure
- Patch web servers and CMS plugins to prevent defacements
- Implement web application firewalls and rate-limiting mechanisms
- Prepare incident communication protocols in case of website disruption or defacement
- Coordinate with national CERTs and sector-specific information sharing groups
Visibility into early-stage reconnaissance and proactive defence can reduce the likelihood and impact of opportunistic attacks.
8. Attribution and Alliances
UserSec is believed to operate from Russian-speaking regions, likely with informal coordination from Russian nationalist networks. There is no evidence of direct state sponsorship, but the group’s ideological alignment with the Kremlin suggests either passive tolerance or indirect support.
UserSec often cross-promotes content from KillNet, NoName057(16), Anonymous Russia, and other loosely affiliated collectives. Attribution is further complicated by the group’s decentralised structure and use of anonymous communications.
9. Conclusion
UserSec Collective represents a persistent and ideologically driven threat actor operating within the broader sphere of Russian-aligned hacktivism. While not technically advanced, its campaigns can disrupt public services, damage reputations, and contribute to information warfare objectives.
Organisations in the UK and other NATO-aligned states, particularly those operating public infrastructure or politically symbolic services, should take practical steps to defend against disruption and disinformation campaigns attributed to UserSec and similar threat actors.
Author:
Threat Intelligence Team, UK Cyber Defence Ltd
All intelligence current as of May 2025
